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According to the ‘enactive’ approach in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, 
mental states are neither identical with, nor reducible to, brain activity. Rather, the 
mind is enacted or brought forth by the whole situated living organism in virtue of its 
specific structure and organization. Although increasingly influential in cognitive 
science, the enactive approach has had little to do with psychopathology so far. In this 
chapter I thus first outline this approach in some detail, and then illustrate its 
conceptual and methodological connections to psychopathology. I also provide some 
indications on how to develop a more explicitly ‘enactive psychopathology’.  
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1 The enactive approach 
 
The term ‘enaction’ was originally introduced in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science by Varela et al.’s The Embodied Mind to characterize a conception of mind 
and cognition profoundly different from the computational-representational one of 
mainstream cognitivism: 
 
‘We propose … the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that 
cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is 
rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the 
variety of actions that a being in the world performs’. (Varela et al. 1991, p.9) 
 
The terms ‘history’, ‘actions’, ‘world’ and ‘perform’ underscore main features of the 
enactive mind, namely its dynamical, embodied and situated character. Cognition is 
not ‘inside’ the brain, representing information about the world, computing it 
according to internal rules, and eventually telling the body how to act; cognition is 
rather enacted or brought forth, over time, by the whole organism (not just its brain) 
situated in the world.  
 This view was not new, and Varela and colleagues indeed explicitly presented 
their work as a continuation of Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behaviour (1942/1963) 
and Phenomenology of Perception (1945/1962). Merleau-Ponty had already defended 
the thesis of the thoroughly embodied and situated nature of the mind on the basis of 
phenomenological and empirical considerations, and had himself been influenced by 
Husserl and Gestalt psychologists (just to mention his most proximate sources). 
Varela et al. importantly brought these ideas into Anglo-American cognitive science, 
joining the efforts of authors such as Dreyfus (1972), who had already drawn on 
continental philosophy to criticize the possibility of symbolic artificial intelligence. 
 Since the publication of The Embodied Mind, the embodied, situated and 
active character of cognition has been emphasized in particular by defenders of the 
 3 
view that perception and action are intimately tied together, indeed that they are 
mutually constitutive rather than mediated by an internal representational system 
(Hurley 1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004). At the same time, supporters of 
the dynamical systems approach in cognitive science (Thelen and Smith 1994; Port 
and van Gelder 1995; Kelso 1995; Thelen et al. 2001) and situated robotics (Brooks 
1991; Matarić 2002) have also underscored the temporal, embodied and highly 
context-dependent character of various cognitive and motor abilities, fuelling the 
philosophical debate on the mind-body relationship and, more specifically, on the 
representational nature of the mind (cf. Clark 1997; Wheeler 2005). 
 It would be restrictive however to reduce the enactive approach to the view 
that cognition, and perception in particular, is active, embodied and situated. 
Enactivism is a complex approach to the conceptualization and study of the mind that 
draws also on, for example, large-scale accounts of brain activity, philosophical and 
biological theories on the nature of living systems, the relationship of life to mind, and 
the nature of consciousness. All these threads have been woven together by 
Thompson (2007) in what can be considered the ultimate synthesis of the enactive 
approach, and more are already being spun (see the recent collection by Stewart et al. 
2010). 
 For present purposes, I will pull out only those threads that are relevant to the 
main goal of this chapter, which is to illustrate points of convergence between 
enactivism and psychopathology, and to suggest possible ways to integrate them more 
explicitly. The threads I have chosen are the following:  
(1) Enactivism’s insistence on the importance of developing rigorous first-person 
methods for the study of consciousness, and for the ‘neurophenomenological’ 
integration of first- and third-person data, namely data about lived experience and 
data about physiological activity.  
(2) Enactivism’s emphasis on the affective nature of cognition.  
(3) Enactivism’s emphasis on the direct bodily and affective nature of 
intersubjectivity.  
 Let us now take a closer look at each of these points. 
 
1.1   Neurophenomenology  
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Varela et al. (1991) already argued that cognitive science, in order to be a science of 
the mind, ought to pay serious attention to the study of consciousness. In particular, 
they emphasized the need to have a well-developed first-person method for such a 
study, which led them to discuss the very old and established Buddhist discipline of 
‘mindfulness meditation’. The latter consists in the cultivation of self-awareness by 
way of practices aimed at making one increasingly ‘present’ to one’s own mind, 
namely increasingly awake to the contents of one’s own consciousness and to the 
‘habits’ of one’s own mind.  
 This emphasis on the need for a systematic and disciplined observation of 
lived experience subsequently led Varela (1996) to elaborate his specific proposal for 
a neurophenomenological method that could integrate data about experience (first-
person data) and data about brain activity (third-person data). According to Varela, 
the former are necessary to make sense of the latter; vice-versa, the latter should be 
used to refine the former. From a philosophical standpoint, neurophenomenology can 
be seen as a method for ‘naturalizing phenomenology’, that is, for making experience 
amenable to natural scientific enquiry. Importantly neurophenomenology does not call 
for the reduction of the experiential level to the physiological one; it does not attempt, 
for example, to translate first-person data into third-person ones (for this approach, 
see Roy et al. 1999). Quite the opposite, it calls for the inclusion of first-person data 
as such in the natural-scientific enterprise of understanding how the organism enacts 
consciousness.  
A few experiments have now been conducted under the 
neurophenomenological agenda.1 In a much-cited study, Lutz et al. (2002) trained 
subjects to report precisely on their experience of coming to see a three dimensional 
image from a ‘magic eye picture’ (a two-dimensional random dot pattern with 
binocular disparities). This training allowed both subjects and experimenters to 
identify categories of experience (feeling ‘ready’ to see the image, feeling completely 
‘unready’, and feeling in a middle state of ‘fragmented readiness’) that were 
subsequently used to make sense of patterns of brain activity recorded while subjects 
looked at the dot patterns. Lutz et al. (2002) indeed were able to identify distinctive 
                                                
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the neurophenomenological approach, including 
a summary of relevant experimental work, see Thompson et al. (2005).  
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patterns of EEG activity corresponding to the experiential states of readiness, 
unreadiness, and fragmented readiness respectively. 
The fact that subjects were trained to observe and report on their experience is 
particularly significant, and characterizes this study as neuro-phenomenological. 
Importantly, training occurred via a mixture of ‘first-person’ and ‘second-person’ 
methods, namely via self-observation but also in interaction with an interviewer, 
whose role was to guide subjects to pay attention to different aspects of their 
experience. Furthermore, the interviewer asked ‘open questions’ that did not constrain 
the range of answers the subjects could give. 
It may be objected that there is nothing special or different about 
neurophenomenology compared to the more familiar cognitive-neuroscientific 
approach. After all, neurophenomenologists also appear to be looking for the neural 
correlates of consciousness; moreover, neurophenomenology is entirely brain-oriented 
and as such appears to be at odds with Varela’s own embodied-enactive predicaments. 
There are however at least two important differences between neurophenomenology 
and cognitive neuroscience. First, neurophenomenology believes that it is not only 
possible but necessary to develop first-person method to obtain reliable first-person 
data. Cognitive neuroscience on its part tries to minimize reliance on self-reports, 
which it generally sees as biased and untrustworthy, and takes behaviour to be a more 
objective measure of cognitive activity. Whereas neurophenomenologists collect first-
person data at the beginning of a study and use them as an ‘organizing analytical 
principle’ (Gallagher 2003, p.86), cognitive neuroscientists collect self-reports, if at 
all, only at the end of a study and mainly for control purposes. Second, 
neurophenomenology does not regard brain activity as sufficient for experience; it 
regards it as just one part of the broader organismic processes that underpin, or better 
enact, consciousness.2 
Admittedly only a few neurophenomenological studies have been conducted 
so far, and the extent to which it is possible to map the structure and dynamics of 
lived experience onto the one of neural and perhaps even non-neural bodily activity 
remains an open question. For present purposes however, what matters is the shift of 
                                                
2 See Colombetti (in preparation) for a less brain-centered ‘neuro-physio-
phenomenology’ that aims at integrating data about experience with data about brain 
and non-neural bodily processes. 
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attitude towards lived experience that is entailed by neurophenomenology compared 
to mainstream cognitive neuroscience, in particular the idea that the neuroscientific 
study of consciousness must include asking subjects what they feel without 
constraining their answers, and using their answers to shed light on the structure of 
specific experiences as well as the physiological activity supposedly enacting them. 
 
1.2 Sense-making and the affective nature of cognition 
 
In the enactive approach, cognition and affectivity are not regarded as two distinct 
psychological faculties. Rather, cognition is inherently affective. To see how, we need 
to look briefly at the notion of sense-making as it appears in Varela’s later writings 
and subsequent elaborations of the enactive approach. This in turn requires a detour 
into the enactive conception of life and of its relationship to cognition. The whole 
story is quite complex and difficult to recount without introducing technicalities, but 
for present purposes it will suffice just to highlight some of its main points (for the 
details, see Thompson 2007, especially chapters 3, 5 and 6).  
 At the very roots of the enactive approach is the claim that all living systems 
are cognitive systems (Maturana and Varela 1980). Specifically, they are cognitive in 
virtue of their autonomous and adaptive nature. An autonomous system is defined as 
one whose constituent processes “(i) recursively depend on each other for their 
generation and their realization as a network, (ii) constitute the system as a unity in 
whatever domain they exist, and (iii) determine a domain of possible interactions with 
the environment” (Thompson 2007: 44). The paradigmatic autonomous system is the 
living cell. Multicellular metazoan systems, nervous systems, insect colonies etc. 
however are also autonomous, even if they do not have a material boundary; they are 
all importantly ‘operationally closed’ systems, constituted by processes whose results 
remain within the system itself. Adaptivity on its part refers to the capacity of living 
systems to monitor and regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of 
viability, and to improve their situation when needed (Di Paolo 2005).  
 According to the enactive approach, the autonomous and adaptive nature of 
living systems makes them into sense-making systems, that is, systems that have a 
perspective or point of view from which they establish their own world of meaning—
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their Umwelt, to use Von Uexküll’s (1921) term.3 As Weber and Varela (2002, 
pp.117-118) succinctly put it: ‘[b]y defining itself and thereby creating the domains of 
self and world, the organism creates a perspective which changes the world from a 
neutral place to an Umwelt that always means something in relation to the organism’. 
The Umwelt is thus not a world ‘outside’ the living system in which the latter grows 
and moves, and into which it occasionally bumps; rather the living system enacts or 
performs its Umwelt, very much like one ‘lays down a path in walking’ (to use 
Varela’s analogy). Importantly, according to the enactive approach, the process of 
establishing a world of significance in this way is the basic ‘mark of the cognitive’. 
This characterization of cognition entails affectivity, in the broad sense that 
the living organism is never indifferent to its existence and environment. As Weber 
and Varela (2002) remark in several passages, the perspective or point of view of the 
sense-making living system is concerned; the living system ‘is interested’ and ‘cares’ 
about its own continuation, so to speak.4 This concern is the correlate of another 
important property of living systems, namely their inherent purposefulness: the 
constituent processes of a living system conspire to maintain its identity against a 
variety of perturbations; in other words the living system strives, as a function of its 
organization, to maintain itself and its conditions of viability. Finally, the very notion 
of an Umwelt is also affective in a broad sense: the Umwelt, as enacted by the 
organism, represents what is relevant or salient for the organism, what matters to it.5  
From an enactive perspective then, it is not really possible to distinguish 
cognition from affectivity without providing a somewhat distorted notion of 
cognition. The separation of cognition and affectivity is an abstraction, the imposition 
of a distinction onto what is fundamentally a simultaneously cognitive-affective 
phenomenon.  
                                                
3 ‘Umwelt’ literally means ‘world around’ and is usually translated as ‘environment’. 
The German term however is used here to refer specifically to the environment from 
the perspective of the living system. 
4 Weber and Varela (2002) draw largely on Jonas (1966/2001). See Thompson (2007) 
for a more detailed account of the relationship between enactivism and Jonas’s 
conception of life.  
5 For a more detailed discussion of the affective nature of sense-making, see 
Colombetti (in preparation). 
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A critical aspect of this view is that it is the whole organism, not just the brain, 
that makes sense of the world. This approach differs considerably from the one of 
mainstream affective science, according to which the faculty responsible for 
evaluating the world in relation to the subject’s needs and concerns, the ‘appraisal’, is 
typically characterized as a ‘non-bodily’ cognitive process. The widespread 
assumption is that the appraisal is a cognitive process realized by some part of the 
brain, which evaluates various aspects of a situation and brings about a series of 
responses in body, behaviour, feeling, etc.6 Even when the cognitive appraisal is 
viewed as a component of emotion (e.g. Scherer 2009), it is still conceptualized as an 
intellectual brainy event distinct from the rest of the organism. From an enactive 
perspective, on the other hand, the process of evaluating the world in relation to one’s 
needs and concerns is enacted by the whole organism in virtue of its organization (for 
arguments, see Colombetti 2007, 2010; Colombetti and Thompson 2008). 
 
1.3 Participatory sense-making 
 
Another recent thread developed within the enactive approach regards the social 
dimension of cognition. In this context, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have 
proposed the notion of participatory sense-making, which extends the enactive notion 
of sense-making introduced above to the domain of ‘being together’. They 
particularly emphasize that accounts of social cognition should not overlook the 
concrete face-to-face (or rather, we should say, body-to-body) interactions that 
pervade our daily living together, namely what Trevarthen (1979) originally dubbed 
‘primary intersubjectivity, i.e. a set of embodied and affective skills involved in non-
conceptual and pragmatic understanding of others. These interactions, they point out, 
typically enact or bring forth a specific form of shared meaning that cannot be 
reduced to each participant’s own sense-making. The interaction, we can say, imposes 
a kind of second-order constraint over the participants, and develops a ‘life of its own’ 
characterized by its own specific style of unfolding; in other words, the interaction 
develops its own form of autonomy. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) particularly 
emphasize the character of ‘coordination’ of concrete social encounters, namely the 
                                                
6 Details vary from one theory of appraisal to the other (see Scherer et al. 2001 for an 
overview of the field). 
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sustained, non-accidental coupling between participants. The notion of coupling at 
play here is borrowed from dynamical systems theory; in simple terms, it refers to a 
process of continuous reciprocal influences between systems (organisms included), 
such that they can be considered one single system. The classic example is the one of 
two pendulums hanging from the same wall that end up oscillating at the same 
frequency (in virtue of the vibrations that each pendulum transmits to the wall), but 
the phenomenon is widespread in physical and biological systems.   
 We know that human intersubjectivity in particular is characterized by 
phenomena of spontaneous mimicking, mirroring and affect attunement. The 
perception of facial expressions of emotions induce in the perceiver distinct facial 
reactions that mimic at least parts of the perceived expression (e.g. Dimberg et al. 
2000). Neural mirror systems exist for both perception and emotion expression. The 
perception of another’s specific goal-oriented action activates one’s own neural motor 
system for that action; the perception of another’s expression of disgust activates 
neural areas that are also active when one experiences disgust oneself (see Rizzolatti 
and Sinigaglia 2006/2008 for an overview of the relevant findings). Furthermore, 
caregivers ‘attune themselves’ to children by reproducing cross-modally the dynamic 
features of their affective states, such as intensity, timing and shape (Stern 1985).  
The enactive approach emphasizes that these modes of bodily and affective 
coupling are pervasive and continuous with ‘higher order’ phenomena of social 
cognition, such as cognitive empathy and enculturation (both discussed in Thompson 
2007, chapter 13; see also Gallagher 2001). Even if during one’s lifetime one will 
develop different modes of interacting with others, bodily and affective coupling is 
not transcended as the organism grows older. Other organisms are part of the 
environment in which we are situated, and interactions with them are a constitutive 
part of the process of enacting a world of significance.  
Also, unlike mainstream positions in the so-called Theory of Mind debate, the 
enactive approach emphasizes the immediate and direct ‘understanding of the other’ 
that characterizes concrete encounters. The idea is that in order to understand the 
other’s actions or expressions, we need neither to recur to a ‘theory’ (as in the so-
called ‘theory theory’), nor to ‘simulate’ the other’s state in ourselves (as posited by 
the ‘simulation theory’). We do not infer the other’s intentions and emotions via some 
intermediate mental operation, but we ‘directly’ see the other’s mind in her bodily 
attitude. Again, this point is borrowed from phenomenology, specifically from 
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accounts of intersubjectivity and empathy developed by Stein, Scheler, and others (for 
references and discussion, see e.g. Zahavi 2007).  
 
2  Connections with psychopathology 
 
Enactivist ideas so far have not been applied to develop worked-out theories and 
methods in psychopathology (for some initial discussions, see Fuchs 2009 and 
Drayson 2009). There are however various points of contact between enactivism and 
current trends in psychopathology—most notably in phenomenological 
psychopathology. The latter emphasizes that lived experience ought to be taken 
seriously, without reducing it to neural activity and/or behaviour. Phenomenological 
accounts of mental illness also underscore its bodily and situated character, as well as 
the profound transformations in the sense of reality and ‘being there’ that it involves. 
The cognition-affect dichotomy has also begun to falter under these more existential 
accounts of mental disorders that emphasize changes in ‘feelings of being’, rather 
than (or at least in addition to) ‘false beliefs’. The enactive approach sits well also 
with pluralistic approaches to treatment which employ bodily practices to modify the 
organism’s dynamics and its modes of relating to the world, including other people. I 
will now look at these points of contact in more detail and, when appropriate, develop 
them further into suggestions on how to elaborate a more explicitly ‘enactive 
psychopathology’.  
 
2.1 Towards a ‘neurophenomenological psychopathology’    
 
We have seen that phenomenology, understood as the systematic analysis of the 
structures of experience, is central to the enactive approach; it is necessary for the 
scientific study of the mind, and in particular for progressing our understanding of 
how consciousness and physical processes are related. Not only is lived experience a 
fundamental aspect of mentality, but in order to study it, it is necessary to describe 
and analyse it as accurately as possible, and to develop appropriate tools and methods 
for this purpose. 
 Phenomenology as a descriptive and analytical tool has also been advocated in 
psychopathology since Jaspers (1913/1997). Jaspers advocated phenomenology as a 
method for providing concrete descriptions of patients’ mental states, for analysing 
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their interrelations, and for identifying, differentiating and labelling them 
appropriately. He particularly valued patients’ self-observation as a primary source of 
data, and open-mindedness on the part of the psychopathologist. The latter should 
neither be too impressed by specific claims on the part of the patient, nor restricted by 
theoretical presuppositions. Individual cases should be carefully scrutinized, with the 
aim of recognizing recurrent similar patterns within and across patients.7 
Since Jaspers, phenomenology has made its way into psychopathology in a 
variety of ways, with the works of Binswanger, Minkowski, Straus, Buytendijk, and 
others (see Spiegelberg 1972 for a historical overview). Recent arguments for a role 
of the phenomenological method in psychopathology, and specific examples of the 
application of phenomenological categories to the understanding of mental disorders, 
can be found for instance in Sass (1992), Parnas and Zahavi (2002), Stanghellini 
(2004), Gallagher (2005), Fuchs (2005), Mullen (2007) Ratcliffe (2008) and Sass et 
al. (2011) (the list is not exhaustive). These works all resist and oppose the 
widespread reductionist attitude of much current psychiatry, which is interested in 
patients’ lived experience primarily for the purpose of merely ‘spotting’ symptoms 
already provided by the diagnostic manuals; once key symptoms are identified, 
experience is quickly left aside to examine ‘more objective’ behavioural and neural 
data, and to identify appropriate pharmacological treatments.  
This method is particularly limiting given that the diagnostic manuals provide 
very succinct snapshots of experience, intentionally leaving aside alleged irrelevant 
and distracting details. The result is a rather mechanical process in which there is little 
room for the identification of features of experience that have not been previously 
recognized as symptomatic. As Mullen (2007, p.114) complains, ‘[w]e now have 
generations of mental health professionals, many of whom have learned all the right 
questions. They may in the process, however, have lost the capacity to listen or to see 
what may challenge or otherwise discomfort the established diagnostic process’.  
                                                
7 Jaspers’ phenomenological approach departs in various respects from Husserl’s, in 
particular from the latter’s quest for ‘essences’, and more could be said about the 
relation between these two approaches. For the purposes of this chapter however I 
simply intend to point out the importance that both enactivists and some philosophers 
and psychiatrists grant to the development of methods for the exploration of 
consciousness. 
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 By contrast, phenomenological psychopathology takes lived experience to be 
an essential aspect of mental illness that deserves full attention and that ought to be 
examined in detail. It uses existing phenomenological concepts and analyses (e.g. of 
self-awareness, temporal experience, background attunements), or develops new ones, 
in order to provide detailed and precise accounts of the experience of a variety of 
mental disorders. The results often challenge received views. Ratcliffe (2008), for 
example, uses his category of existential feeling to criticize accounts of delusions that 
only emphasize distortions of ‘beliefs’. According to Ratcliffe, delusions involve 
fundamental changes in ‘how one finds oneself in the world’ in terms of existential 
background orientations—as when we say that one feels ‘at home in the world’, or 
alone, estranged, connected, in tune, etc. These ways of feeling are not directed at 
specific objects or events, but are backdrop orientations against which other 
experiences take place, and which also determine the kind of experiences one has or is 
likely to have. Like Heidegger’s (1927/1962) moods, Ratcliffe’s existential feelings 
are not merely contingent colorations of consciousness, but fundamental ways of 
being attuned to the world. They cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes, i.e. 
mental states such as beliefs that take propositions as objects (‘I believe that this body 
is not mine’, ‘I believe that someone is putting thoughts in my head’). Hence 
disorders such as Capgras’ delusion for example, where subjects report believing that 
other people (usually relevant others such as partners, relatives or close friends) are in 
fact impostors pretending to be them, cannot be reduced to mere false beliefs but 
encompass a deeper change in existential feeling, namely in how reality as a whole 
and oneself in it are experienced.  
 Valuing lived experience in psychopathology is not just an exercise in 
phenomenological analysis per se, but has relevant diagnostic and therapeutic 
implications. Classifications of mental disorders are notoriously fuzzy and fluid. More 
dramatically, they are, as Hacking (e.g. 1999, p.103) puts it, interactive kinds, they 
‘can influence what is classified’ and can be modified or replaced because they 
interact with what is classified. Interactive kinds induce ‘classificatory looping 
effects’: the thing classified changes its behaviour as a consequence of being so 
classified, which in turn requires a change in the original classification, and so on. 
These looping effects, as Hacking (1999) illustrates, are revealed in the history of the 
classification of psychopathologies such as mental retardation, childhood autism, and 
schizophrenia, as well as multiple personality disorder (Hacking 1995), and the now 
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extinguished fugue (Hacking 1998). This history shows that psychopathologies are 
‘moving targets’ – their descriptions and classifications vary over time, and with them 
the behaviour and experience of the people classified, which in turn induces new 
descriptions and classifications, etc. Hence both the way a mental disorder manifests 
itself in behaviour and experience, and the diagnostic categories used to identify it, 
are subject to fluctuations and variations; looking up a pre-given fixed list of 
symptoms may thus become inadequate, or even a hindrance, to a comprehensive 
understanding of a specific condition. 
The phenomenological approach in psychopathology is better suited than 
mainstream psychiatry to track these looping effects, because it aims to engage 
repeatedly with the patient to identify salient features of his life and experience, and 
to do so without imposing theoretical pre-conceptions and schemata. Mullen (2007, 
pp.117-118) lists five stages that, in his view, ought to characterize a thoroughly 
phenomenological method in psychopathology. The first consists in facilitating 
spontaneous accounts of experience and behaviour, without being guided by 
assumptions about what counts as pathological, reasonable, symptomatic, plausible, 
etc. A structured investigation may also be used that focuses on experiential 
categories such as experience of time, distance, direction, reality, causation, sense of 
control and agency, etc. This process should be repeated in the course of therapy, not 
just confined to preliminary stages. The second stage consists in ‘augmenting’ self-
accounts with artistic, literary and philosophical works that also provide descriptions 
and analyses of experience with which the patient resonates. Third, the therapist 
should be empathetic and try to grasp the qualities of the patient’s lived experience, as 
well as help him or her find words for it. This use of empathy should remain modest, 
and avoid imposition of pre-established theoretical frameworks and evaluations. In 
the fourth stage a summative description of the patient’s experience and behaviour is 
derived. Some ordering and systematization is applied at this point. In the final stage 
phenomenological categories are brought in to produce a provisional classification 
which may be modified after subsequent observation of experience and behaviour.  
 This approach has a lot in common with neurophenomenology. Both methods 
reject a merely behaviouristic and/or neurophysiological stance; they take lived 
experience seriously and do not attempt to reduce it to something else. Both methods 
strive to minimize theoretical preconceptions about the nature of experience; they 
encourage spontaneous reports, as well as an empathetic relationship between 
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therapist and patient (or experimenter/interviewer and subject) to provide rich 
descriptions of lived experience and to reveal structures and invariants that might 
otherwise remain unnoticed, or that are not part of standard descriptions of symptoms. 
Also, importantly, both approaches share a conception of experience that is far from 
fixed or static, but rather moving, fluctuating and developing, subject to endogenous 
(neural, biological) as well as contextual (immediate environment, other people, near 
past or future events) and broader social-symbolic influences. In 
neurophenomenology, as we have seen, this conception of experience as dynamical 
and open implies that first-person data can, and should, be changed and stabilized 
with first- and second-person methods, as well as refined by third-person data. In 
phenomenological psychopathology, the same conception implies that a subject’s 
experience needs to be repeatedly engaged with and explored in the therapeutic 
context, rather than limiting this investigation to the initial stages of the diagnosis. 
Neither approach assumes that no invariant whatsoever can be identified in 
experience; rather, both imply that part of the process of understanding lived 
experience involves exploring its flexibility and openness, and the way it responds to 
intervention. 
 Now, phenomenological psychopathology and neurophenomenology so far 
have been separate fields of inquiry, but it is possible to envisage a 
‘neurophenomenological psychopathology’ that extends the neurophenomenological 
method to the study of mental disorders. Such an approach would provide a bridge 
between biological and phenomenological strands within psychiatry, often considered 
incommensurable paradigms. Within such an integrated approach, lived experience 
would be explored systematically to identify relevant categories; the latter would then 
be used to organize and interpret data about neurophysiological activity; these data in 
turn could be used to identify finer-grained dimensions of experience.8  
                                                
8 One may note here that not all aspects of lived experience can be usefully linked to 
neurophysiological activity, and vice-versa; there may be features of the structure of 
experience that are not amenable to being illuminated by third-person data. Take for 
example the notion of the ‘depth’ of affective experience discussed by Ratcliffe 
(2010), which refers to the degree of specificity of the intentional object of an 
experience. On this account, the sadness for, say, the loss of one’s favourite teddy 
bear is shallower than the sadness for one’s inability to engage less than superficially 
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 Gallagher’s (2005) account of schizophrenia can be seen as a step in this 
direction. He draws on Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness to provide a 
phenomenological account of experiences of thought insertion and loss of sense of 
agency typical of the condition. In particular, he argues that schizophrenia may 
involve a disruption in the protentional dimension of time-consciousness, namely in 
the orientation towards what-is-to-come-next that, according to Husserl, characterizes 
all experiences of the present moment. According to Gallagher, ordinarily our sense 
of agency—the pre-reflective sense that I am the one generating my thoughts and 
actions—is always protentionally oriented toward what is to happen next. If that 
weren’t the case, I would be constantly surprised by my thoughts and actions, as if 
they had just appeared, unexpectedly, in my experience and behaviour; I would still 
have a sense of them as my thoughts and actions (sense of ownership would be 
retained), as in the case of ordinary unbidden memories, but I would not experience 
them as part of my agency. Gallagher proposes that this is just what happens in 
schizophrenia: the ‘protentional mechanism’ is disrupted, and with it the sense that 
one is the intentional future-oriented source of one’s thoughts and actions. The latter 
thus appear ‘inserted’ by an outside source or force.  
 What makes Gallagher’s discussion a step towards a neurophenomenological 
psychopathology is that he also compares his account with evidence from 
neuroscience, in particular with a study by Frith and Done (1988) showing that for 80 
per cent of schizophrenic subjects with positive symptoms, the EEG response to tones 
generated by the subjects themselves by pressing a button was similar in amplitude to 
the response generated to randomly occurring tones. Previous evidence had shown 
that in non-schizophrenic subjects, random tones generate a relatively larger response 
than self-generated ones. Gallagher thus suggests that Frith and Done’s result 
                                                                                                                                       
with other people, which is in turn shallower than the sadness for the status of human 
rights in the world. These forms of sadness differ in existential import, and I agree 
that finding out that they corresponded to, say, different degrees of neural synchrony, 
would not be particularly interesting from a phenomenological-existential point of 
view. From the perspective of someone who is interested in how experience and 
physical processes are linked, however, it would be interesting to find out that the 
degree of specificity of the intentional object of an emotion corresponded reliably to 
different patterns of brain activity. 
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confirms the view that schizophrenics fail to experience their own actions as self-
generated, and rather experience them as surprising, as if they were generated from an 
outside source. These considerations could be used to design a 
neurophenomenological study that recorded neural activity as subjects reported their 
experiences ‘online’, to see whether specific experiences of loss of sense of agency 
are indeed correlated with distinctive patterns of neural activity.  
 Another relevant approach here is Petitmengin et al.’s (2006) work on 
epilepsy. They employed a phenomenological method to explore in detail the nature 
of preictical symptoms (the experiences that usually precede an epileptic seizure). 
Specifically, they were able to distinguish between the experiences occurring during 
the ‘aura’ (also known as simple partial seizure), which is sudden and relatively brief 
(it lasts a few seconds or minutes), and the ‘prodromes’, which are more progressive 
and can last up to a day. Unlike the aura, the prodromes have not been much 
investigated, and are not usually recognized and discussed in the clinical context.  
 The methodology that Petitmengin and colleagues employed to identify these 
differences in experience corresponds in many respects to the one recommended by 
Mullen (2007). They used a log form to ask hospitalized epileptic patients to reflect 
every morning on their state of fatigue, stress and emotional condition in general, as 
well as on particular bodily, visual and auditory sensations. Another log form with 
similar questions had to be filled in by the patients after each seizure; this form also 
asked patients to focus on the quality of their experience immediately before the 
seizure, to remember what they were doing then, at which moment they had started to 
feel specific sensations, how long did they last, and more. Similar questions were 
asked in another log form that patients had to fill after a ‘mini-crisis’, namely a 
preictal episode that did not lead to a full seizure. These forms importantly alternated 
questionnaires in which subjects had to rate their current condition on a numerical 
scale, with more open questions in which subjects were asked to report and describe it 
in their own words.  
Semi-structured interviews were also used. In the first stage of the interview, 
patients were asked to recall a specific preictal experience, and to relive it by 
remembering in as much detail as possible the images, sensations, sounds, etc. 
associated with it. In the second stage, patients were asked to ‘slow down’ the 
recollection of their experience, to attend to, thematize or make explicit aspects of it 
that had so far remained implicit or unnoticed. In the third stage, the interviewer 
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helped the patients put their experience into words. At the end of the process the 
investigators extracted the ‘microstructure’ of each personal experience (the precise 
sequence of sensations, feelings, etc. that constitute it) and detected regularities across 
experiences.  
  From a clinical perspective, this phenomenological work is in itself already 
very valuable. Epileptic patients are often only vaguely aware of how their experience 
changes in the hours preceding a seizure, yet they can learn to become more sensitive 
to these changes. This ability is particularly important for therapeutic purposes, 
because once subjects are able to ‘catch’ preictal symptoms in time, they can also 
learn to engage in activities that delay or even prevent the onset of a seizure.  
 Petitmengin and colleagues’ approach however is not ‘only’ 
phenomenological but, like Gallagher’s account of schizophrenia, attempts to bridge 
data about experience with data about neural activity. They compared the results of 
their phenomenological analysis with those of EEG measurements of the neural 
concomitants of preictal and ictal episodes. It had already been shown (e.g. Le Van 
Quyen et al. 2003) that about five minutes before the onset of a seizure, a decrease in 
synchronization or ‘phase-scattering’ characterizes brain activity around the 
epileptogenic focus; these brain areas also tend to become relatively isolated 
compared to the interconnectivity characterizing the interictal phase (the phase 
between seizures free from ictal and preictal symptoms). Petitmengin et al. (2007) 
suggest that these phase-scattering may be characteristic of prodromes, as opposed to 
the neural synchrony that characterizes the ictal phase (including the aura). This 
suggestion, as they acknowledge, still has to be verified as no study has been 
conducted yet on the ‘real time’ correlation between the microdynamics of experience 
and those of brain activity. Such a study would count as thoroughly 
neurophenomenological.  
In addition, a thoroughly neurophenomenological study of epilepsy could use 
data about neural activity to refine first-person data. Specifically EEG data could be 
used as biofeedback to help epileptic subjects become more sensitive to changes in 
their experience. Biofeedback as a technique involves continuously measuring some 
dimension of a subject’s biological activity, and showing the measurement to the 
subject in real time, as it is taking place. In biofeedback therapy, subjects use the real 
time signal to monitor and regulate their awareness. Attempts to use EEG biofeedback 
to treat epilepsy go back to the 1970s (see e.g. Cott et al. 1979); other dimensions of 
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bodily feedback have been used since then to treat various conditions, such as 
migraine, muscle contraction, rheumatoid arthritis, and anxiety, including 
cardiophobia (Birbaumer and Kimmell 1979). Recent studies have shown that it is 
relatively easy to train subjects to regulate their emotion experience by using ‘real-
time fMRI’ (deCharms 2008). Johnston et al. (2010) targeted brain areas known to 
activate significantly during unpleasant emotions, and showed subjects various 
positive, neutral, and negative pictures (that is, pictures known to elicit pleasant, 
indifferent, and unpleasant emotion experiences respectively). Subjects received 
feedback about activity in these areas by looking at the picture of a thermometer 
whose temperature reflected increases in fMRI amplitude signal, and were instructed 
to regulate activity in the target brain regions by relying on the feedback. 
Interestingly, subjects were able to regulate activity in the target areas already from 
the first run. 
Some mental disorders, starting with affective disorders, could be similarly 
approached by a neuroimaging-enhanced phenomenological method: subjects could 
become increasingly sensitive to changes in their awareness (like unpleasant or 
aversive feelings in response to specific stimuli that may initiate, for example, 
obsessive rumination) via the integrated use of self-exploration, second-person 
methods and biofeedback, and eventually learn to divert or even prevent 
unwholesome experiences. It is notable that recent approaches to depression have 
started to integrate cognitive behavioural therapy, which is based on the analysis of 
thoughts and behaviour, with ‘mindfulness’ therapy (derived from Buddhist 
mindfulness practices) that requires clients to cultivate a heightened awareness of 
their experience, not only of recurrent patterns of thoughts, but also of a variety of 
bodily sensations and feelings (see Segal et al. 2001). This approach could be used to 
explore specific features or forms of the experience of depression, inform findings 
about neurophysiological (neural, but also bodily) processes, and also use the latter to 
refine understanding of the experience of depression. 
To recapitulate, in this section I have illustrated one line of convergence 
between the enactive approach and psychopathology, notably the primacy that both 
neurophenomenology (which is an offshoot of the enactive approach) and 
phenomenological psychopathology attribute to lived experience and to the 
development of rigorous methods for its investigation. In addition, I have suggested 
that the neurophenomenological method may be fruitfully applied to the study of 
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mental disorders to provide a bridge between the more mainstream biological 
approach in psychiatry, and phenomenological psychopathology.  
 
2.2 Mental disorders as disorders of embodiment and situatedness 
 
In spite of neurophenomenology’s focus on the brain, as we have seen the enactive 
approach rejects the view that the mind is in the brain. Rather, it maintains that mind 
and experience are enacted or brought fourth by the whole organism embedded in its 
environment. Analogous views can be found in psychopathology (and, again, 
especially in phenomenological psychopathology), in accounts of mental illness that 
emphasize its embodied and situated character versus the tendency to see it merely or 
primarily as a disorder of the brain. According to Fuchs (2009), for example, mental 
illness needs to be understood in the broader context of the embodied and situated 
nature of the person, namely as a disorder that straddles brain, body and world. As he 
points out, even when it is possible to identify neural impairments accompanying 
specific mental disorders, the neurobiological characterization of the disorder does not 
do justice to the patient’s condition. Of course this claim does not entail that 
neurochemical imbalances do not contribute to disorders of experience and behaviour, 
or that a neurophenomenological approach could not reveal important neural 
characteristics of such disorders. The point is rather that the causal factors relevant to 
mental disorders extend well beyond the skull, and consist of a broader complex 
system of reciprocal influences crisscrossing brain, body and world.  
 Fuchs himself suggests to look at schizophrenia ‘as a circular process, 
implying neuropsychological and biochemical dysfunction on the one hand and 
psychosocial alienation on the other’ (Fuchs 2009, p.230). In his account, biological 
imbalances contribute to withdrawal from the world in the prodromal phases of the 
condition; withdrawal subsequently leads to disruption of attunement to the world and 
other people, which feeds back onto the subject’s condition and eventually leads to 
psychotic crises and appearance of delusions. Similar considerations apply to 
depression, which according to Fuchs (2001, 2009) consists in a complete breakdown 
of the continuous engagement and ‘synchronization’ (his term) that characterize our 
everyday interactions with one another, as well as our relation to the environment 
more broadly. This breakdown results from an initial failure to cope with a major 
change, namely from a failure to re-synchronize with an altered world. The individual 
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then retreats from the world by reducing her interactions with it, including other 
people. Social desynchronization eventually leads to ‘biological desynchronization’, 
manifested physiologically in disturbances of neuroendocrine processes, temperature, 
sleep-wake and menstrual cycles among other things. These organismic processes 
augment psychosocial desynchronization: the depressed person stops being in time, 
does not participate in joint decision-making, and at the level of concrete encounters a 
tendency towards stasis disrupts coordination with others in terms of bodily 
attunement (turn-taking, mutual expressivity and gestuality).  
 With respect to autism, Peter Hobson (e.g. 2009) similarly argues that it is 
misleading to reduce it to the impairment of a specific cognitive skill within a brain 
module, such as the capacity to ‘read’ other people’s minds. In his view autism is best 
understood as primarily a disorder of one’s affective engagement with others in face-
to-face encounters, including the capacity directly to see feeling in facial expressions, 
to share feelings with others, and to understand what the other’s emotions are directed 
toward. An impaired ability to read other minds, Hobson suggests, is the result rather 
than the cause of the autistic child’s interpersonal difficulties. Disruptions in the 
capacity to participate in bodily social-affective ‘forms of life’ (to use Wittgenstein’s 
term, as Hobson does) prevent the development of the capacity to share the other’s 
experience and to take the other’s perspective.  
 The embodied and situated nature of mental disorders is also apparent in 
accounts of the lived experience of mental illness. Existing accounts in 
phenomenological psychopathology underscore alterations in the experience of one’s 
body and world, including other people. In the experience of depression, for example, 
one’s own body comes to the foreground of awareness inducing a disproportionate 
absorption into one’s bodily feelings and pain (Fuchs 2005, 2009). In social 
interactions, this self-absorption prevents depressives to enter into bodily and 
affective (gestural, expressive) resonance with others. Schizophrenia also comes with 
disorders of bodily self-awareness. Schizophrenics often have difficulties locating 
themselves (‘Am I here or there? Am I here or behind?’; see Parnas and Sass 2001, 
p.106) and their bodily parts feel disconnected. As some put it, schizophrenia 
specifically involves a disorder of ipseity or pre-reflective bodily self-awareness, 
namely of the ordinarily tacit awareness we have of our body as ours and as the agent 
of our actions (e.g. Parnas and Sass 2001; Sass 2004). It is argued in particular that 
schizophrenia involves bodily hyper-reflexivity, namely an automatic ‘popping into 
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awareness’ of bodily sensations that would ordinarily stay in the background. At the 
same time, this condition comes with several disorders in the experience of other 
people: the boundaries between oneself and others are experienced as blurred, and the 
generation and control of one’s own actions and thoughts are often attributed to 
others; at the level of concrete interaction, schizophrenics appear to lack pre-reflective 
and pragmatic or commonsensical understanding of other’s affectivity and 
intentionality (hence Stanghellini and Ballerini’s 2004 term ‘schizophrenic autism’). 
In addition, the physical world appears alien and strange, flat and disproportionally 
detailed; objects and utensils do not afford the actions they normally do, and aspects 
or events in the world lose their salience. As Sass (2004) puts it, schizophrenia 
involves an experience of ‘unworlding’. 
Now, one could remark that none of these considerations refute the claim that 
any mental illness really is a neurochemical impairment, and that disruptions in 
bodily activity, situatedness and experience are either causes or effects of such an 
impairment, but not events constitutive of the illness. Indeed most cognitive 
neuroscientists are ready to acknowledge that body and environment affect the brain, 
and vice-versa, while they still think of the mind as somehow primarily dependent on, 
and/or even located in, the brain.  
From an enactive perspective however, to see the non-neural body and the 
environment as merely contingently related to one’s mental life, including mental 
illness, is to misconstrue the relationship between the mind and the physical world. 
The brain does not sit in the organism as a central processing system, representing 
information about the world that comes to it through bodily sensory channels, and 
causing the body to act according to specific instructions. Rather the brain is 
physically entangled with the rest of the organism via a very complex network of 
continuous reciprocal exchanges of energy and matter (see Cosmelli and Thompson 
2010 for a detailed account of the various dimensions of brain-body coupling). From a 
biological point of view, the brain is an organ able to perform its functions only when 
embedded in the context of an autonomous living being; living beings at the same 
time emerge from and are sustained throughout by the environment to which they are 
coupled. Thus the idea that one can isolate the nervous system from the network of 
causal interrelations in which it is so deeply embedded to designate it as the seat or 
source of mentality is a chimera. To construe mental illness as ‘merely’ a neural 
impairment is equally misleading, the result of the same neurocentric prejudice. 
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Because of its emphasis on the embodied and situated nature of the mind, 
when it comes to treatment an enactive perspective calls for a pluralistic approach that 
does not exclude the use of drugs, but also favours ‘alternative’ therapies such as 
bodily and interactive practices. Various such practices already exist—see for 
example Gutstein’s (2009) Relationship Development Intervention (RDI) approach to 
treating autism, which includes exercises of bodily coordination and turn-taking to 
restore affective resonance with others; music therapy, such as improvised music-
making, is also used to engage autistic children in dialogical interactions and 
coordination with others (e.g. Wigram and Elefant 2009); and in Röhricht et al.’s 
(2009) bodywork treatment for chronic schizophrenia subjects are asked to engage in 
a variety of tasks involving their body, from dance movement therapy to Neo-
Reichian body psychotherapy and sensory awareness. It follows from the preceding 
paragraph however that, from an enactive perspective, these practices are not mere 
indirect ways to act distally on the alleged primary source of mental illness, i.e. the 
brain; rather they act directly on concrete constitutive parts of the disorder. 
Irrespective of whether or not these practices end up affecting neural activity, they 
should be seen as directly manipulating the disorder itself.  
 
2.3 Cognitive-affective shifts in mental disorders 
 
Finally let us briefly consider the convergence between the enactive view that 
cognition is inherently affective, and current views in psychopathology. There is a 
close relationship between the enactive view that living systems are sense-making 
systems that enact their Umwelt, and the notion of existential feelings discussed by 
Ratcliffe (2008) and introduced earlier. The latter, as we saw, consist in feelings of 
how one ‘finds oneself in the world’. They are thus world-oriented experiences, 
however at the same time they are bodily feelings—not in the sense that they take the 
body as an intentional object, but in the sense that they are bodily experiences of the 
world, experiences of the world-through-the-body. Likewise the enactive notion of 
sense-making implies that the world one finds oneself in (one’s Umwelt) is always 
correlated to one’s bodily structure and experience.  
 According to Ratcliffe (2008), disorders such as schizophrenia, depression, 
Capgras’ syndrome, etc. involve radical shifts in existential feeling—as shown for 
example by changes in how one’s own body is experienced, and correlatively by 
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changes in how the world appears to the subject. From an enactive perspective, 
psychiatric disorders are to be understood as shifts in sense-making, resulting in an 
extra-ordinary and therefore often disconcerting Umwelt. Importantly, for both 
approaches these shifts are cognitive and affective at the same time. They are 
cognitive in the sense that they involve changes in perception, imagination, and 
understanding of others, which take different forms depending on the disorder in 
question. However these cognitive changes are not appropriately characterized merely 
in terms of changes in one’s propositional beliefs. Rather they involve deeper changes 
in what strikes one as salient; in what demands attention and affords interaction, and 
what does not anymore; in the awareness of one’s possibilities of sensorimotor and 
affective relations to the world. These changes thus also encompass, crucially, the 
sphere of personal salience and affectivity, which thus cannot really be disentangled 
from their cognitive dimension. 
Both notions of sense-making and existential feelings cut across the 
widespread conceptual divide between feelings, body, and intentionality/cognition. 
This divide is deeply entrenched in the analytic tradition of philosophy of mind and 
emotion, in which feelings are typically characterized as ‘mere feelings’, that is, non-
intentional conscious states dislocated from any meaningful action and interaction 
with the world. The same tradition typically sees bodily phenomena (behaviour, 
expression, physiological changes and bodily sensations) as mere effects of cognitive 
processes (such as judgments) that do not participate in the activity of making sense 
of the world. As we have seen, from an enactive perspective bodily processes are, 
rather, constitutive of the process of perceiving and interpreting the world, both 
experientially and subpersonally, and the distinction between cognition and affectivity 
is rejected accordingly. Existential feelings similarly cut across the distinction 
between cognition and affect, intentionality and bodily feelings. In existential feeling, 
the feeling body is constitutive of one’s sense of reality; the latter is not provided by a 
disembodied faculty of cognition, but is given to the subject via the world-feeling 
body. To appeal to these notions to account for mental illness implies, then, 
acknowledging the complex holistic shift that this brings with it. Mental illness 
amounts neither only to disruptions of cognitive-propositional skills, nor only to 
alterations of affectivity and mood. Rather it involves a more radical and deeper 






In sum then, there are various common threads between the enactive approach, and 
current trends and practices in psychopathology. These common threads depend 
mainly on the fact that both the enactive approach and psychopathology have 
‘phenomenological connections’; as such, they both value lived experience, 
emphasize the bodily and situated character of the mind, and the fact that what is 
constructed as salient depends constitutively on the organism’s structure, interests and 
goals. 
 To be aware of these commonalities is important to generate further ideas and 
methods. We have seen for example that an enactive neurophenomenological 
approach could be explicitly adopted to explore whether and how experience and 
neurophysiological processes correlate in mental disorders; also, emphasizing the 
complexity of the mutual relations of brain, body and world, as enactivism does, can 
provide reasons within psychopathology as to why mental illness should not be 
reduced to neurochemical impairments, and as to why alternative forms of treatment 
such as bodily practices should be considered equivalent to drug-based therapy. These 
are only some initial ideas. Given the current thriving intellectual atmosphere 
surrounding both enactivism and psychopathology, I believe that more convergences 
are likely to be identified and developed into more precise research programs in the 
near future.     
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